Soviet Lt. Viktor Belenko became an instant celebrity when he successfully defected to the West by flying his Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 Foxbat jet fighter across the Sea of Japan to Hakodate, Japan, on Sep. 6, 1976
Soviet Lieutenant Viktor I. Belenko brought only two personal items on his dramatic 1976 escape to freedom in a MiG-25 Foxbat from the USSR to Japan: a knee pad with flight notes and his military ID.
Born in 1947, Belenko served as a fighter pilot in the Soviet Air Defense Forces at Chuguyevka, near the Soviet Union’s eastern border. He became instantly famous after successfully defecting to the West by flying his Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25 Foxbat across the Sea of Japan to Hakodate, Japan, on September 6, 1976.
As previously mentioned, Belenko did not return from his scheduled sortie that day. His commanders might not have been overly concerned had he simply crashed into the Sea of Japan. Instead, the revelation that he had safely landed at Hakodate International Airport was a profound shock.
BBC Future reports that, in order to avoid detection by both Soviet and Japanese military radar, Belenko had to fly extremely low—around 100 feet (30 meters) above the ocean surface. Once he was deep enough into Japanese airspace, he climbed to about 20,000 feet (6,000 meters) so Japanese radar could register the MiG. The Japanese, caught off guard, attempted to contact the unknown aircraft, but Belenko’s radio was set to different frequencies. Although Japanese fighters were dispatched, Belenko soon descended again beneath the thick cloud layer and vanished from their radar scopes.
During the entire journey, the Soviet pilot was essentially navigating by instinct, relying on his recollection of maps he had studied before takeoff. Belenko had planned to bring his jet to Chitose airbase, but as his fuel supply dwindled, he was forced to land at the closest airport he could find, which turned out to be Hakodate.
The Soviet government then pressured Japan, insisting that the seized Foxbat be returned immediately. With no legal grounds to refuse, Japan sent the MiG-25 back, but taken apart and packed into crates. They did this deliberately to conceal the detailed examination that Japanese and U.S. intelligence specialists had carried out on the aircraft.
In reality, Western experts had very limited reliable data on the Foxbat’s performance until Belenko defected. After his arrival, the U.S. government questioned him for five months and then kept him on as a consultant for several years. He had brought along the MiG-25 pilot’s manual, anticipating that he would help American pilots assess and test the aircraft.
Soviet specialists quickly discovered the extent of Western knowledge about the aircraft. After the MiG-25 was returned to the USSR, they determined that the Americans had run its engines, recorded its infrared signature, and conducted a thorough examination of its systems and avionics—including the radar and structural materials. Because they did not fully understand how to operate some of the equipment, the Americans damaged certain components and then rushed to fix them, as evidenced by foreign fuses and resistors found in the radar.
The incident sparked a media frenzy worldwide, with sensational coverage of the MiG-25. U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger declared that this new Soviet interceptor was powerful enough to force major changes in Western weapons programs and military strategy.
The MiG-25 held a particularly important role in Soviet air defense because, until the MiG-31 Foxhound was introduced, the Soviets considered it the only aircraft capable of intercepting the Lockheed SR-71A strategic reconnaissance plane.
In 1980, Belenko co-authored his autobiography, MiG Pilot: The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko, in which he writes that MiG-25 pilots were ordered not to fly faster than Mach 2.5 and that he believed the Foxbat could not safely go beyond Mach 2.8. When he heard reports that MiG-25s had reached Mach 3.2 over Israel, he responded that such speeds would have ruined the engines and that the pilots were fortunate to have survived.
In his autobiography, Belenko asserts that SR-71s operated along Russia’s coastline, “taunting and toying with MiG-25s sent up to intercept them, scooting up to altitudes the Soviet planes could not reach, and circling leisurely above them, or dashing off at speeds the Russians could not match.”
Armed with two R-40 missiles (NATO designation AA-6 “Acrid”), the Foxbat could climb to about 78,000 feet, but carrying its full load of four missiles reduced its ceiling to roughly 68,900 feet. Because the SR-71’s cruising speed was higher than the Acrid’s top speed, a rear-aspect (tail-chase) interception was impossible, and it appears that the Foxbat’s radar and fire-control system were not advanced enough to manage a head-on intercept at closing speeds of more than Mach 5.
Photo by Unknown
