As the F-4G crew prepared to take off in ‘Michelob 61’ (F-4G 69 0270, which ended Desert Storm credited with five radar kills), they were told that their tanker aircraft had aborted, and there were no spares
The F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft were upgraded versions of the F-4E Phantom II, with the original cannon replaced by AN/APR-47 electronic warfare systems. Each F-4G was flown by a pilot and an Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO). The EWO was responsible for navigation, communication support, and coordinating attacks against surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. In total, 116 F-4Es were converted into F-4Gs specifically for this role.
The main objective of the F-4G Wild Weasels was to target and destroy enemy air defense systems, such as surface-to-air missile (SAM) radar installations. During Operation Desert Storm, while equipped with AGM-88A/B/C HARM missiles, these aircraft operated together or guided other fighter jets, like the F-16, to engage and neutralize SAM sites.
According to Peter E. Davies in his book F-4 Phantom II Wild Weasel Units in Combat, the Wild Weasel crews also assisted B-52 bombing missions targeting Iraqi Republican Guard units concealed in the Kuwaiti desert. Flying at 30,000 feet, these large bombers were at risk from SA-2 missiles just as they had been during the Vietnam War, but by 1991, they also faced more advanced SAM threats. The designated F-4G flights flew ahead of the bomber cells, making preemptive HARM launches at the threat sites that had the improved SA-2D/E missiles.
Maj. Steve Jenny and Capt. Mark Buccigrossi received the Silver Star for their actions on January 18, when they successfully redirected three waves of SA-2 missiles away from a group of B-52 bombers. By releasing chaff, using their electronic countermeasures pod, and performing evasive maneuvers, they ensured that the missiles detonated safely behind their F-4G aircraft.
On January 28, there was almost a B-52 shoot-down when four SA-3s and one SA-2 missile were launched from Al Qaim—a location thought to be cleared of missile threats after heavy bombing. The B-52s had been rerouted to that area without the knowledge of the SEAD team, so no Wild Weasel aircraft were present to provide support. As a result, Lt. Gen. Glosson decided that every SAM site needed to be destroyed to ensure complete safety, instructing Maj. Gen. Glenn Profitt, the Director of Electronic Combat for Desert Storm, to maintain a record of all SAM sites and their destruction dates.
Maj. Uken and Lt. Col. Gelwix described their most memorable HARM missile strike on the fourth night of the conflict, January 20, 1991, while supporting a group of B-52s called ‘Boston 30’ as they attacked the Medina Republican Guard Division headquarters in Kuwait. As they prepared for their mission in the F-4G ‘Michelob 61’ (which ultimately achieved five radar kills during Desert Storm), they learned there would be no tanker aircraft available for refueling, as their assigned tanker had aborted with no replacements. Uken went on to recall the events that followed.
‘Knowing that the B-52s had already departed Cairo West airfield [in Egypt] and were flying across the barren lands of western Iraq, we were betting that they were unaware of our dilemma. With only a centerline tank and four HARMs, we knew we were already going to be well beyond our minimum fuel plan, including a pre-strike refueling. Despite having no chance of a post-attack refueling, we were committed to the support task anyway, even if it meant having to land short at one of the Coalition bases just south of the Kuwaiti border.
‘Loss of the tanker required some re-planning. We told the rest of the “Michelob” F-4G flight to stand by while we came up with a plan. After plugging the target coordinates into the INS, arriving at a straight-line distance, and calculating flight time and fuel requirements, it became apparent that we could get to the target but would have no loiter time. To cover the B-52s’ vulnerability period in the threat ring, we decided to break the flight into four single aircraft with 20-mile spacing in trail formation to extend our collective on-station time. After calculating take-off time, we called the other jets in “Michelob” flight and explained the amended plan to them.
‘Once airborne, it all went pretty much as planned, and as we approached the target from the south, we were able to find “Boston 30” on radar still about 15 miles from the threat ring. Less than a minute later, an SA-6 target tracking radar came up, and we started working him. As the B-52s were still outside the threat ring, we calculated that the SA-6 was focused on them, so we delayed the shot for a few seconds. We fired, made the perfunctory “Magnum” call, and verified the missile’s Time to Impact cue, which looked good.
‘Just as the SA-6’s missile guidance radar came up, we got an excited call from the EWO in the lead B-52 informing us that he thought they were going to shoot. I was able to tell him, “Okay, HARM time to impact is x seconds”. The HARM fly-out cue soon showed “:00”, and four seconds later, the SA-6 “went dotted” [off the air]. “Boston 30” had one happy aircraft commander, who promised us a case of scotch (still waiting for it).
‘“Michelob 62” then called “In position” as we turned south for our “skosh” egress and headed for home plate. We “zoomed for the moon” for fuel [economy], did our best imitation of a Space Shuttle descent, and were able to make it back to Shaikh Isa after logging a single bag [one drop tank] mission of just 1.9 combat hours.’
F-4 Phantom II Wild Weasel Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
