A MiG-25 ‘Foxbat,’ which flew into the no-fly zone at Mach 2.5 and headed directly for a high-value asset, created several problems, for the F-15C Eagles had to react quickly if they were to protect their charges, thus exposing gaps in the CAP screen
For more than a decade, the F-15C has been a central asset in US and Coalition air operations in the Middle East, flying missions over both northern and southern Iraq in support of Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch.
As described by Steve Davies in his book F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Coalition aircraft spent over ten years policing the southern no-fly zone below the 32nd Parallel and the northern no-fly zone above the 36th Parallel in an effort to contain Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Responsibility for restricting the movement of Iraqi aircraft, helicopters, and military vehicles—under Operation Southern Watch (OSW) and Operation Northern Watch (ONW)—fell primarily to units from the United States and the United Kingdom, with France participating until the mid-1990s. Over time, these missions evolved from a loosely defined and imperfect cease-fire agreement arranged by the US at the conclusion of the 1991 Gulf War into highly effective, US-led enforcement regimes that shielded Iraq’s marginalized Shiite population in the south and the Kurds in the north.
Once in the air and on station (pilot jargon for being over enemy territory at the designated CAP point and ready for action), the Eagle formations would break into two-jet elements. Four-ship formations were always tactically preferred and easier to justify over the relatively smaller area covered by Operation Northern Watch (ONW). However, because the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) generally behaved in a predictable way, making a surprise mass attack very unlikely, and because Operation Southern Watch (OSW) had to cover a vast area, the Eagles extended and thinned out their coverage.
Since Iraq’s main military air bases were constantly under radar surveillance, even a single aircraft couldn’t take off without the Coalition detecting it immediately. If a sizable group of Iraqi aircraft did appear, there was plenty of time to call in more F-15s for backup if necessary.
For most of Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) generally avoided confrontation, choosing instead to conduct training flights in airspace outside the no-fly zones. It was not always so passive, though. When it did go on the offensive, the IrAF relied on decoys and deceptive maneuvers to try to draw Coalition fighters into ambushes or to expose high-value assets such as tankers and AWACS aircraft to attack. The most notorious tactic was the so-called “high fast flyer” — a MiG-25 Foxbat that would dash into the no-fly zone at Mach 2.5 on a direct course toward one of these key assets. This posed serious challenges for the Eagles, as they had to respond immediately to shield their charges, which in turn opened up holes in the CAP coverage.
The idea behind this tactic was that the Foxbat would pull the F-15s away by forcing them to focus on it, creating an opening for other Iraqi fighters to make quick, cutting attacks on the now-exposed high-value aircraft. Although this method was fairly predictable, it was still hard to counter due to the Foxbat’s very high speed. Among Coalition fighters, only the F-15 had both the range and combat capability to reliably intercept it.
On most sorties, the Eagles came under some degree of ground fire from anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) or surface-to-air missile (SAM) crews, who continued to target Coalition jets in clear violation of the 1991 cease-fire. While most AAA was ineffective above about 15,000 feet, the largest guns — around 100 mm — still posed a danger even at the medium altitudes where the F-15s typically operated. This unguided, barrage-style fire could usually be avoided and was often meant mainly to harass. However, accurate shots could easily shoot down an F-15, so the threat was taken seriously. SAM launches were less frequent than AAA fire, but they were the most dangerous, as skilled operators learned to fire missiles using visual cues instead of radar. This denied pilots any electronic warning of a launch and made it extremely difficult to track a SAM once it was in the air.
Iraqi pilots also employed an intriguing tactic that blended air and ground threats into a kind of “honey trap.” MiG crews would try to draw F-15s away from their CAP positions and into the engagement zones of previously unidentified SAM sites or anti-aircraft gun areas. At times, this ploy worked. It usually began with a MiG crossing into the no-fly zone, then immediately retreating once the F-15s committed to an intercept. As the Eagles pursued, they would suddenly be met with heavy gunfire or SAM attacks. It soon became clear that F-15 pilots had to be cautious about chasing a MiG that was flying in a direction other than toward its own home base. Capt Nick Guttman, who completed two OSW tours, encountered exactly this scenario.
“On my 23rd mission, I led my wingman to investigate an AWACS track of interest. AWACS believed it was a MiG-29 on a test flight inside sovereign Iraqi airspace. We knew they occasionally flew their “Fulcrums,” and we wanted to get a better idea of how many they were operating. We were dispatched to take a look, and upon committing to the track (leaving the CAP station to investigate), the MiG promptly returned to base. As we came within range, we were illuminated and engaged by SA-2 and SA-3 missile sites. I ordered the combat jettison of tanks as we evaded the threat, and the engagement came to nothing. We turned tail and returned to our CAP station. It was only after we landed that I had the opportunity to explain to my wingman, who was flying his first combat mission, that OSW missions were rarely that exciting!”
F-15C/E Eagle Units of Operation Iraqi Freedom is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
