Seventy-five Airmen died supporting the operation, 33 of whom died in the 15 downed B-52 Stratofortress bombers—the primary bomber flown during Operation Linebacker II
Between Dec. 18 and Dec. 29, 1972, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB) conducted 729 sorties against 34 targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation Linebacker II. At the height of the Vietnam War, Andersen hosted more than 15,000 Airmen, 153 B-52 bombers, and 20 support aircraft.
The bombing campaign proved successful, as it led to the North Vietnamese releasing 591 American prisoners of war and resuming peace negotiations. Less than a month after the operation, the Paris Peace Accords were signed. The effort to achieve “peace through strength” reached its fullest expression during Operation Linebacker II.
Even so, seventy-five Airmen lost their lives in support of the operation, including 33 who were killed in the 15 B-52 Stratofortress bombers that were shot down—the main bombers used during Operation Linebacker II. How did the North Vietnamese manage to bring down 15 B-52s, a feat no one else has accomplished?
John Chesire, a former U.S. Navy pilot who flew 197 combat missions during the Vietnam War, explains on Quora. His key points are as follows:
- In 1972, North Vietnam had a highly effective, layered air defense network. The sheer volume of firepower directed at the B-52s reached an intensity not seen since World War II and unmatched in the years that followed.
- For that era, the Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and radar systems the North Vietnamese operated were extremely capable. They deployed numerous SAM sites across the region, with the greatest concentration positioned near the B-52s’ intended targets.
- A particularly important factor was that many of these SAM batteries were staffed by well-trained and highly skilled Soviet specialists who supported the North Vietnamese. [It should be emphasized that, during the Cold War, the Soviets were very eager to test their front-line air defense systems in an actual combat environment to gauge their performance. Consequently, the Russians devoted substantial effort to this mission and rapidly refined their tactics for shooting down B-52s over those 11 days in December.]
Chesire continues.
“While the Soviet SAMs, AAAs, and Russian advisors had a lot to do with shooting down 15 B-52s and damaging several more, there were some guilty ones on the US side of the war that also helped to cause B-52s to get shot down.”
- Unfortunately, these large-scale B-52 raids were planned and controlled by generals stationed far away at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, relying on outdated plans and tactics carried over from anticipated World War III scenarios—methods ill-suited for a conventional, more limited campaign. Ideally, planning should have occurred at the operational level, closer to where the B-52 crews were actually based in Guam and Thailand. Even worse, when seasoned operational commanders proposed alternative tactics, their recommendations were overruled by the generals back home.
- Remarkably, throughout these missions—especially in the first few days—the B-52s followed highly predictable patterns. Notices to Airmen were widely distributed before each raid. Making matters worse, the bombers typically flew straight in, one after another, all on the same heading every time. I watched them one night and was stunned.
- The real deciding factor—and the most deadly vulnerability—for these B-52s was their turn point after bomb release. Once again, this maneuver became predictable, leaving them highly exposed, a fact the Soviet technicians quickly exploited. This post-strike turn appears to have been a holdover from nuclear strike doctrine, in which a tight turn was executed immediately after weapons release to escape the nuclear blast. However, during such a turn, their otherwise excellent suite of electronic countermeasures (ECM) was severely degraded. The 3-aircraft cells that normally provided powerful mutual ECM coverage while flying straight ahead lost this protective radar masking once they entered a tight turn, making them visible—and no longer effectively jammed—to SAM radar operators. In that moment, they became easy targets for surface-to-air missiles.
This weakness at the turn point went unnoticed beforehand because the Air Force had never thoroughly explored it during their testing and evaluation exercises.
Chesire concludes:
“Thankfully, after a few tragic nights with many B-52 losses and men, there was a near mutiny at the Officers’ club in Guam of the B-52 crews. The crews demanded that the strike tactics be modified to give them a better chance of survival. Similar pressure was made at the B-52 bases in Thailand. Their voices were finally heard and heeded. The experienced operational commanders then took over the planning and tactics, making many changes that made a significant impact on their survival rate the following days.”
Top Image: Jack Fellows, ASAA; Photo by U.S. Air Force
