It is interesting to note that the B-36 program might have been canceled at least five times during the big bomber’s career. It is a testament to the Peacemaker itself that it did manage to survive during a difficult transitional period in Air Force history.
In response to the US Army Air Force’s need for a strategic bomber capable of intercontinental range, Consolidated Vultee—later known as Convair—developed the B-36 Peacemaker during World War II. The aircraft completed its first flight in August 1946, and by June 1948, Strategic Air Command had taken delivery of its first operational B-36. Several B-36s were used for photographic reconnaissance, while others were modified to launch and recover specially adapted RF-84F/K reconnaissance aircraft.
By the time production concluded in August 1954, the US Air Force had received more than 380 B-36s. Between 1958 and 1959, the USAF phased out the B-36 in favor of the B-52. Though it never saw combat, the B-36 played an important role in deterring enemy aggression.
As Meyers K. Jacobsen explains in his book Convair B-36: A Comprehensive History of America’s “Big Stick,” the B-36 program may have faced cancellation on at least five occasions during the bomber’s service life. The aircraft’s survival through such a challenging transitional era in Air Force history speaks to its enduring value and capabilities.
First possible cancellation:
A letter of intent sent by the Army Air Forces to Convair on July 23, 1943, was replaced a year later by a formal contract covering 100 B-36 aircraft. Valued at $160 million, the agreement included a fixed fee of $6 million as well as the cost of all spare parts and engineering data. By that time, however, the contract no longer held priority status, although the delivery timeline stayed unchanged, with the first production B-36 scheduled for August 1945 and the final one for October 1946.
As victory drew closer, wartime contracts came under review for possible cancellation or major reductions. On May 25, 1945, aircraft production was cut by 30 percent, eliminating 17,000 planes. In the case of the B-36, however, there was no doubt that a long-range bomber remained necessary. In 1945, the B-36 appeared to be the best solution, and on August 6, 1945, General Arnold approved the Air Staff’s recommendation to leave the B-36 production contract unchanged.
Second possible cancellation:
On December 12, 1946, General Kenney—who had been promoted to four-star rank in March 1945 and had led SAC since April 1946—proposed cutting the order for 100 B-36s down to only a small number of service-test aircraft. Based on the performance estimates available at the time, he considered the B-36 inferior to the upcoming B-50, an improved version of the B-29. Among the aircraft’s weaknesses, Kenney pointed to a practical range of just 6,500 miles, inadequate speed, and insufficient protection for its fuel supply. The Air Staff and Lt. General Nathan F. Twining, commander of AMC, disagreed with that assessment. Twining argued that the B-36 should not be judged only by the XB-36, which had only recently begun flight testing, and noted that all new aircraft—including the B-17 and B-29—experienced early development problems. He also emphasized that the B-36 was the only aircraft far enough along to serve as an interim long-range atomic bomb carrier until the B-52 became available. General Carl Spaatz, the AAF’s new commander, fully supported Twining’s view, and the B-36 contract remained unchanged.
Third possible cancellation:
The new Air Force Aircraft and Weapons Board, established by Deputy Chief of the Air Staff General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, convened on August 19, 1947, to examine the future role of strategic bombing and the methods for carrying out such missions if required. The senior officers were tasked with recommending the weapons that would best support the Air Force’s long-range plans for development and its gradual expansion to 70 groups.
Board members held differing views on how to address these complex issues. Some saw the B-36 as already outdated and supported purchasing high-speed jet bombers, despite the risk that such aircraft would lack sufficient range and would not be ready for several years. Others favored boosting the B-36’s performance with the proposed VDT engine so it could serve as a multipurpose bomber. Another group preferred the B-50, since it was faster than the current B-36 and could achieve even greater range and speed with VDT engines added.
After lengthy debate, the board ultimately agreed to keep the B-36 in service as a specialized bomber until it could be replaced by the B-52, no earlier than 1953. Once again, the B-36 program escaped cancellation.
Fourth possible cancellation:
When it became clear that a faster version of the B-36—the B-36C, which was to be fitted with VDT engines—was not achievable, the Air Force again considered canceling the entire program. Even so, several important factors had to be weighed. By the spring of 1948, twenty-two of the standard, relatively slow B-36As were close to completion, and a substantial amount of money had already been invested in the controversial project. As a result, the Air Force chose to delay making a final decision. It directed Air Materiel Command to forgo modifications on several factory-completed B-36As that had been waiting for adjustments and instead speed up their delivery. This would enable Convair to accelerate the aircraft’s flight-test program. In addition, new evaluation measures, known as VR diagrams, were to be used to compare the B-36’s actual performance with that of other bombers under the same conditions.
Although the test results were not especially impressive, they favored the B-36. The much-criticized aircraft now appeared likely to perform better than many had anticipated. If that proved true, any rushed cut to the production contract could have undermined the program just as it was starting to show results. The Soviet blockade of West Berlin, which began on June 18, 1948, ended the Air Force’s hesitation. Alarmed by Soviet aggression, USAF leaders unanimously decided to continue with the B-36. The planned 34 B-36Cs equipped with VDT engines were changed back to the B-36B configuration, ensuring that the Air Force would receive 95 of the 100 B-36s covered by the contract signed in June 1943. Once again, the B-36 program avoided cancellation.
Fifth possible cancellation:
The 1949 defense budget cuts intensified tensions between the military services. Both the Air Force and the Navy had long understood that the branch assigned the atomic mission would ultimately command a larger portion of the budget. As a result, each became increasingly suspicious of the other’s strategic plans. At the same time, the B-36—the Air Force’s platform for delivering atomic weapons—faced heavy criticism, even though very few people had actually seen it, much less flown aboard it.
At the beginning of 1949, the future of the B-36 was in serious doubt. An anonymous document circulated through the press, Congress, and the aircraft industry, alleging corruption in the aircraft’s selection and claiming that its performance fell short of Air Force assertions. In August, a second unsigned paper accused the Air Force of significantly overstating the value of strategic air warfare. The House of Representatives Armed Services Committee investigated the allegations of corruption and favoritism and quickly found them to be unfounded. On August 25, 1949, the inquiry ended after both the Air Force and Convair were cleared.
Nevertheless, the B-36 hearings resumed in October. In simple terms, the committee had to determine, at least temporarily, whether the nation should depend on intercontinental bombers and the strategy of massive retaliation in the event of an attack, or instead rely on the Navy’s fleet and air power to protect North America. Despite concerns about whether the B-36 could avoid enemy fighters, the Air Force came out of the October hearings in a strong position.
This highly public challenge to the B-36 ultimately led to the bomber’s vindication. The B-36 program was preserved, and the Air Force escaped cancellation for the fifth time.
Convair B-36: A Comprehensive History of America’s “Big Stick” is published by Schiffer Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
