Although a full investigation into the incident was never carried out, it is possible that inexperience in handling the Strike Eagle with external fuel tanks was the primary cause of the accident
Operation Desert Shield, which preceded Operation Desert Storm, opened with the deployment of F-15C/Es to the Persian Gulf. On Aug. 9, 1990, F-15E Strike Eagle fighter-bombers from the 336th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) “Rocketeers,” part of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) based at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (AFB), arrived at Thumrait AB in Oman via Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Thumrait already held substantial U.S. Air Force weapons stockpiles that had been pre-positioned precisely for such a contingency.
As told by Steve Davies in his book F-15E Strike Eagle Units in Combat 1990–2005, the 336th initially found itself in a state of confusion. Operating as the 4th TFW (Provisional) under the command of Col. Russell “Rusty” Bolt, the squadron had no clear orders or guidance. The gravity of the situation was unmistakable. Nine Iraqi Republican Guard divisions were massed at the Kuwaiti border, poised to push south into Saudi Arabia, and Saddam Hussein might also have been eyeing the kingdom’s vital oil fields. It soon became clear that the “Rocketeers” were the only unit in a position to slow and disrupt such an offensive, even though the potential cost to the squadron was almost too grim to contemplate.
By Aug. 11, the unit had 12 aircraft on alert, but reaching that level had required significant effort. Capt. Mike “Smy” Smyth arrived in the theater on Christmas Day 1990. He later recalled that at that point the Strike Eagle was only authorized to drop 500-lb Mk 82 and 2,000-lb Mk 84 LDGP (Low Drag General Purpose) bombs, even though additional weapons had already been evaluated under the Seek Eagle test program at Eglin AFB.
The unit, therefore, viewed the idea of dropping the Mk 20 Rockeye Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU) from the jet with some consternation, since the weapon had not been fully tested on all stations. Their worries were well-founded: some crews had seen test-release footage showing the Strike Eagle prototype being hit by a 500-lb bomb that had just been dropped from a CFT, only to be sucked back up behind the wing and strike the horizontal stabilizer.
The Mk 20 Rockeye was an area-effect weapon that scattered hundreds of bomblets, each about the size of a cricket ball, over a space roughly equivalent to a football field. This made it far more effective than LDGP bombs for destroying lightly armored targets. The Air Force waived its usual rules and allowed the 336th to load these otherwise “unauthorized” stores on the jet, officially adding the Mk 20 to the F-15E’s arsenal.
Two F-15Es were also kept ready to shield the base or any strike package from enemy threats, armed with AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles.
Morale in the squadron quickly deteriorated as the crews spent two weeks with no proper communication link to Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) FIQ in Riyadh. As a result, the unit was effectively grounded and could only launch if Iraqi armor began moving again. When flying eventually resumed, Lt. Col. Bolt compounded the frustration by imposing a 300-ft minimum training altitude. Under intense pressure not to lose an aircraft—the overriding concern of any wing commander—he was likely worried that an accident in training would not only weaken the squadron’s ability to defend Saudi Arabia but also cost him his command.
Many crews later ignored the imposed training altitude, believing they had to fly below 200 ft if they were to survive Iraq’s dense, coordinated network of Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA). This act of defiance ultimately cost at least one pilot his flying status.
Ironically, it was during this period that F-15E 87-0203 was lost on a mission unrelated to low-level flying. The Strike Eagle was conducting intercepts against a pair of RAF Jaguar GR.1s when it slammed into the desert on Sept. 30, killing its pilot, Maj. Pete Hook, WSO, Capt. Jim Poulet. Although no full investigation was ever completed, it is thought that inexperience in flying the Strike Eagle with external fuel tanks may have been the main factor behind the crash. Al Gale, a WSO with the “Rocketeers,” explained:
“Aircrews are taught the various sensory illusions that can deceive you when flying. One of them is a lack of depth perception for your altitude when you are flying over a nondescript surface, such as a smooth ocean or flat desert. The desert in the Middle East was extremely bad in this respect. The surface was often completely smooth sand with no vegetation at all. It looked exactly the same whether you were flying at 300 ft or 30,000 ft. Flying at night over the southern part of Saudi Arabianlooked just like flying over the ocean. Although we were over the land, there were no visible lights as far as the eye could see in all directions. The only way to tell your altitude was to look at the altimeter, whether it be day or night. Pete and Jim were fine aviators, and their loss was both a shock and very sad for all of us.”
This incident was followed by the fatal low-level crashes of an RF-4C on Oct. 8 and an F-111F on Oct. 11. In response, CENTAF headquarters issued an order mandating that all aircraft, except the B-52, were henceforth restricted to a minimum training altitude of 500 ft. Strike Eagle crews reacted to this directive with a mix of frustration and disbelief.
The tactics that emerged from ad hoc meetings of senior squadron leaders were ironically centered on the “Pop” maneuver—the very technique that had previously been prohibited because of its high risk. Dive and Dive-Toss attacks were considered as alternatives, but the medium-altitude SAM threat meant they were unlikely to be practical. A quickly assembled Mission Planning Cell (MPC) did what it could to ready the crews for combat, yet what was really needed was coordinated, centralized guidance.
F-15E Strike Eagle Units in Combat 1990-2005 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
