‘Then my leader yelled, “Break, break, we have two aircraft behind!” So, I forgot about the smoking Phantom and turned away. I left him southeast of Suez, and the jet crossed into Sinai. I think the F-4 crashed on the way home…,’ Ahmed Atef, Egyptian Air Force MiG-21 Pilot
The Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) intense efforts to acquire the F-4 in the late 1960s stemmed from clear advantages. The aircraft’s range, payload, and bombing accuracy exceeded anything in their previous arsenal by orders of magnitude.
After their 1969 acquisition, F-4 Phantom fighters rapidly became the IAF’s cornerstone.
Within just three months of delivery, Israeli casualties in the War of Attrition reportedly reached their lowest point since hostilities began, and Egyptian air defenses were supposedly “neutralised.” Tom Cooper, David Nicolle, Lon Nordeen, Patricia Salti, and Martin Smisek explain in their book “Arab MiGs, Volume 4” that Israel launched a campaign of supersonic “booming” over Egyptian towns to gain public relations advantages. F-4Es joined Mirages in flying at supersonic speed and low altitude, shattering windows throughout Egypt. Egypt responded by intensifying pressure on Israeli positions in the Sinai. On December 9, 1969, four Su-7BMKs executed such a devastating attack on the HAWK SAM site near Baluza that Israelis failed to launch a single missile in defense, with even the Mirages scrambling too late. The Israelis attempted to pursue the retreating Sukhois west of the Suez Canal but were intercepted by MiG-21F-13s piloted by 1st Lieutenants Ahmed Atef and Munir. These two young, bold Egyptian pilots tried to correct their GCI’s mistake (which vectored them in front rather than behind the enemy formation) by executing a head-on cannon attack against the two Mirages. Having completed their protective mission for the fighter-bombers by forcing Israeli withdrawal, both pilots disengaged without waiting to observe their attack results. Later that afternoon, the IDF/AF returned to bombard eight SAM sites at Abu Suweir and between Ismailia and Cairo, prompting the scramble of the same two Egyptian pilots again, as Atef described:
`We had scrambled from Inchas and joined four other MiG-21s from Kom Awshim. Once in the air, the GCI informed us about the situation. The Israelis were flying a reconnaissance with Mirages in the direction of Bani Suweif. The first four MiG-21s went to intercept the two Mirages that were underway at a low level, but could not reach them because the Mirages were flying too fast. So the MiGs went back to their base, and we were to protect their landing. Then the GCI told us that there were eight Phantoms approaching us over the Gulf of Suez, at an altitude of 6,000m [19,685ft]. Four other MiGs had scrambled from Inchas to support us, and they were soon about 15km [9.3 miles] behind us. The GCI continued feeding us information about the situation, then ordered us to get to maximum speed, release belly tanks, go to afterburner on, climb to 10,000m [32,808ft], and advised us that the target was at 35km [21.7 miles] at 11 o’clock (I have the tape-recording of this engagement).
‘The first flight of F-4s was distributed in two sections of two, and the second flight was further away. After I made my combat turn, I saw the number three and four Phantoms, and my leader confirmed he had two aircraft in insight. Then we saw a missile in flight—an Israeli air-to-air missile. It passed through our formation but did not hit anything. The leader of the Israelis then made a very smooth turn, but his number 2 delayed a little, and my leader went after the number 2. When the Israeli saw the two MiGs approaching, he made a quick turn to the right and forgot about his leader. He escaped, making a very good egress, and was gone to the coast.
`I looked around and saw another Phantom about 5km [3.1 miles] away, but my leader said that these were approaching MiGs. I looked again and saw their noses were black: all our aircraft had green noses – the Su-7s, MiGs—all had green noses. So I went after him. Now I knew he was a poor pilot; he made some turns but could have gotten away if he had dove down and run. I was flying a MiG-21F-13 and could not have caught him if he did this. We maneuvered, and I reached a position around 200m [656ft] behind him and opened fire with my cannon. He made a very gentle turn and put his afterburners off so that I fell back to around 1,000-1,200m [3,281-3,937ft] behind him. I believe he could not see me. We were at a low level, and I knew that below 500m [1,640ft] altitude, the Atoll would go into the ground if I fired down at the target. I dropped below him to make the Phantom the only heat source in the sky.
`This was my first time to shoot an Atoll. I was on vacation when the squadron shot Atolls in training. I remember the speed was 1,250km/h [777mph], which was outside the limits of the MiG-21F-13 at that altitude, but I did not care. I had a tone from the missile, and I launched it. The missile went for the F-4 and the explosion was below the aircraft. Nothing happened, just a bang, smoke, and the Phantom was still flying. So I fired another missile. There was another explosion below the F-4, and I think the left engine started to smoke, but it was still flying. I couldn’t believe what was going on, so I changed to the gun and approached the jet. He was slowing down, and I didn’t want to open fire until I had him in my lap. Then my leader yelled, “Break, break, we have two aircraft behind!” So, I forgot about the smoking Phantom and turned away. I left him southeast of Suez, and the jet crossed into Sinai. I think the F-4 crashed on the way home …’
At least according to available Israeli publications, no F-4 was lost on this day, and thus although Ahmed Atef subsequently became known as ‘FFK’ (for ‘First Phantom Killer’) among his fellow pilots, he probably became the first eyewitness to the built-in survivability of what was then the finest fighter-bomber in production in the US.
Photo by SSGT Bill Thompson / U.S. Air Force, Bukvoed and Real.Egyptian via Wikipedia and Israeli Air Force
