Al-Masry’s jet was then hit by 30mm cannon fire from one of the Mirages and exploded, killing the pilot. It was the first MiG-21 shot down in air combat over the Middle East ever.
The air engagement of April 7, 1967, is sometimes incorrectly linked to footage from the July 30, 1970, ambush, in which Israeli forces set up against Soviet-piloted aircraft in Egypt—two entirely separate events.
The conflict commonly labeled the “Water War” had roots stretching back to 1952, when Israel began construction of its National Water Carrier (NWC), a project designed to divert water from the Jordan River. The United States initially opposed this, pressing for a UN-administered arrangement that would account for neighboring states’ water needs—Jordan in particular stood to lose its primary water source. Despite American threats to withhold economic aid, Israel pressed ahead, completing the project in the early 1960s with financial support from West German Holocaust reparations.
In response, the Eisenhower administration enlisted the Tennessee Valley Authority to design a comparable project for Jordan, which resulted in the East Ghor Channel, fully funded by Washington, with construction beginning in 1958.
That same year, Egypt and Syria merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR), which developed its own water utilization plan for Syria. Lebanon pursued a similar initiative. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes that repeatedly disrupted construction. By 1960, Egyptian President Nasser had become convinced that Israel was preparing to invade Syria, prompting a secret Egyptian military mobilization in the Sinai—one the Israelis failed entirely to detect. When Israeli intelligence finally became aware of it, the strikes against Syrian construction sites ceased. This episode would later prove significant in shaping Nasser’s decision-making during the May–June 1967 crisis.
Following a military coup in Damascus in September 1961, Syria withdrew from the UAR. In 1964, the Arab League revived the Syrian and Lebanese water diversion projects. While a successful Syrian diversion of the Jordan River could theoretically have crippled the NWC, most observers recognized the effort as largely impractical. Nevertheless, Israeli attacks on Syrian infrastructure continued even during periods when construction had stalled entirely. A common pattern involved Israeli armored tractors being driven into one of two demilitarized zones along the 1947–1949 armistice line: if Syrian forces did not return fire, Israeli forces would open fire first; when Syrians responded, Israeli air and artillery strikes would follow — targeting not only Syrian military positions but nearby villages and construction sites as well. Israeli authorities consistently attributed such operations to PLO attacks on the NWC (of which there were only two, both unsuccessful) and to Syrian shelling of Israeli settlements — which did occur, but invariably as a reaction to prior Israeli provocations and never at the scale of Israeli destruction of Syrian villages on the Golan Heights.
Initial Action
After regaining independence in 1961, Syria undertook a full reconstruction of its armed forces, placing an order for 48 MiG-21F-13s. These entered service in 1963 and were soon involved in clashes with Israeli aircraft. Syrian pilots encountered persistent problems: the Soviet R-3S missiles proved ineffective, and the NR-30 cannon ammunition was unreliable. Unlike the French, who took Israeli complaints about the Mirage IIICJ seriously and worked to resolve them, the Soviets dismissed Syrian concerns outright. This was the era of Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin, and Soviet missile technology was regarded as the world’s finest. The blame for repeated failures — including the inability to intercept Israeli Vautour IIBR reconnaissance jets routinely violating Syrian airspace — was placed squarely on Syrian pilots rather than on equipment shortcomings.
The Ambush of April 7, 1967
On March 31, 1967, Fatah militants destroyed an irrigation pump and damaged railway lines near the Jordan River inside Israel. Israeli armored tractors were subsequently driven into the DMZ near Kibbutz Ha-On; Syrian anti-tank fire knocked them out. Israel responded by demolishing the village of Tewfik, which had already been largely evacuated due to previous Israeli air strikes.
Emboldened by the limited Syrian reaction, the IDF repeated the exercise in April 1967. Syrian forces opened fire on Israeli tractors again; Israel struck back against Syrian artillery positions, and the Israeli Air Force bombed the village of Sigufiya, killing 14 civilians. Syrian artillery then shelled Kibbutz Gadot, prompting further Israeli air strikes on Syrian gun positions.
At 15:50 local time, the Syrian Arab Air Force (SyAAF) scrambled four MiG-17s and two MiG-21s. While the formation was bombing Kibbutz Ein Gev, it came under attack by Israeli Mirages armed with Shafrir Mk.I air-to-air missiles. All four missiles missed, but one forced First Lieutenant Mohammad Sa’eed al-Masry into a hard evasive maneuver. His aircraft was then struck by 30mm cannon fire and destroyed, killing him — making him the pilot of the first MiG-21 shot down in air combat over the Middle East. The Israelis would go on to claim five or six additional kills that day.
Two more MiG-21s were subsequently claimed by Israeli pilots near Damascus, approximately 30 minutes later. UN observers on the ground reported seeing two aircraft go down in the area at that time, but no Syrian source — official or otherwise — acknowledges those losses. Syrian accounts instead claim five Mirages were downed in exchange.
Israeli formations then penetrated deep into Syrian airspace as part of what was effectively a prearranged ambush. The SyAAF commander, Hafez al-Assad, attempted to hold his forces back, recognizing the trap, but pressure from his superiors became overwhelming when Israeli Mirages appeared over Damascus. At 17:10, four MiG-21F-13s were scrambled from Dmeyr Air Base to intercept an Israeli formation approaching through Jordanian airspace. The Syrian aircraft were met by multiple Mirage formations and fared badly: three were shot down. Their pilots — Captain Ali Antar, Captain Mohi ad-Din Dawood, and Ahmed Quwwatli — all ejected safely over Jordan and were subsequently repatriated to Syria.
Consequences
The Israeli Air Force flew over 200 combat sorties that day, against just 28 by the SyAAF — a disparity that underscores the degree of Israeli preparation. Final Israeli claims amounted to six or seven MiG-21s for no losses of their own. Official Syrian sources acknowledged four aircraft lost while claiming five Mirages. The sole Israeli evidence made public consists of three gun-camera sequences. The Syrians produced no supporting evidence for their own claims but did publish the names of their four downed pilots; al-Masry was posthumously decorated for bravery.
The three separate air engagements of April 7, 1967, collectively served as a prelude to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Alarmed by mounting Israeli pressure on Syria, Moscow sought to push Nasser into replicating his 1960 mobilization of Egyptian forces in the Sinai. Despite advice from his own military that no Israeli invasion of Syria was imminent, Nasser complied with Soviet urging. Events then escalated beyond Soviet ability to manage them — with consequences that continue to shape the Middle East to this day.
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Photo by Israeli Air Force, Tom Cooper and brewbooks from near Seattle, USA via Wikipedia
