Between January and August 1964, a research program was held to investigate the possibility of maximum-range flights of Tu-95 and 3M bombers at 50-200 m (164-660 ft.) in the daytime and at 200-300 m (660-980 ft.) at night
When the Myasishchev design bureau was re-established in 1951, it was promptly assigned the task of developing a high-speed strategic bomber to counter the threat posed by NATO’s heavy bombers, particularly the B-52.
Designated M-4 and given the NATO reporting name “Bison,” this new four‑engine turbojet bomber was created in an extraordinarily short period—only one year. It incorporated some advanced design elements, such as bicycle‑type landing gear, and was built around the most powerful jet engine available at the time. The aircraft went on to form the basis of a small series of bombers and aerial refueling tankers, including the significantly upgraded 3M and its variants.
Could the Bison actually break through the air defenses of the “potential adversary” (NATO)? According to Yefim Gordon and Dmitriy Komissarov in their book Myasishchev M-4 and 3M: The First Soviet Strategic Jet Bomber, the dense network of radar picket stations, surface-to-air missile sites, and supersonic interceptors spread across Western Europe and North America left it with very slim chances of getting through, even in a surprise first strike. The M-4’s six cannons offered only limited protection. The crew’s main hope lay in the aircraft’s electronic countermeasures suite and the armor plating designed to shield them from shrapnel.
The infamous downing of Francis Gary Powers’s high‑altitude Lockheed U‑2A reconnaissance aircraft (56‑6689) by an S‑75 surface‑to‑air missile (NATO reporting name SA‑2 Guideline) near Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960, clearly demonstrated that strategic bombers could no longer assume safety at very high altitudes. Yet, it soon became evident that their supposed extreme vulnerability to enemy air defenses had been overstated. The United States quickly developed a countermeasure: beginning in 1962, B‑52s were to breach enemy SAM defenses by flying at low altitudes, where missile guidance radars struggled to track them. Training exercises indicated that low‑level and ultra‑low‑level penetration tactics could offer a reasonable chance of success.
The Soviet Union responded similarly. From January to August 1964, it conducted a research program to assess whether Tu‑95 and 3M bombers could fly maximum‑range missions at altitudes of 50–200 m (164–660 ft) during the day, when terrain and obstacles were visible, and at 200–300 m (660–980 ft) at night. This low‑level flying tactic greatly improved the chances of a single aircraft breaking through enemy air defenses (flying in formation at such altitudes was dismissed, not least for safety reasons). However, the severe turbulence close to the ground put extra stress on the airframe—an area where the Myasishchev bomber held an edge over the Tu‑95, thanks to its flexible wings, which handled turbulence more effectively. Another key advantage was the Bison’s smaller frontal radar cross‑section due to its jet engines; by contrast, the Tu‑95’s propellers significantly increased its radar signature.
Yet these low‑altitude sorties never advanced beyond the experimental phase; to use this tactic in regular operations, the aircraft (including the 3M) needed structural modifications to endure the turbulence encountered close to the ground. The Ministry of Aircraft Industry (MAP) refused to take on this work, so it ultimately fell to the Ministry of General Machinery (MOM). The Council of Ministers instructed Viktor N. Bugaiskiy, head of Branch 1 of MOM’s OKB‑52, to ensure that the 3M low‑level combat operations program was added to the task list of KB‑90, led by V. Gusarov, with the work scheduled for January–February 1966. Although the bomber’s range on a ‘hi‑lo‑hi’ mission profile was sharply reduced, this was seen as an acceptable trade‑off for the lower vulnerability during air defense penetration.
Another important factor was that, despite the M‑4 and 3M experiencing some reliability problems, they were still significantly more dependable than the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the same period. Moreover, unlike ICBMs, strategic bombers were highly mobile—even more so than the newly introduced ballistic missile submarines. They could be redeployed quickly and, if necessary, assigned a new target while already en route.
Actually, the Bisons were at first cleared to operate only from a limited number of bases with long runways—Engels‑2 AB, Ookrainka AB, Dyagilevo AB (near Ryazan in central Russia), Siauliai (pronounced “Shaooliay,” in Lithuania), and Chagan AB (in Kazakhstan). To address this, a procedure was developed in which the bombers took off with a reduced fuel load, enabling them to disperse to almost any Soviet airfield if a preemptive strike seemed likely. Squadron pilots soon found that with a lower takeoff weight, the M‑4 practically jumped off the runway.
Myasishchev M-4 and 3M: The First Soviet Strategic Jet Bomber is published by Schiffer Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by LT Dave Parsons / U.S. Navy
