The US Navy F-8 pilots that instructed USAF F-4 crews in ACM and beat them during every engagement

The Navy pilots destroyed their USAF brethren, to the obvious delight of the F-8 ‘drivers’ and the continued frustration of the air force

Nicknamed by its pilots as the “last of the gunfighters” for its four Colt-Browning Mk 12 20 mm cannons, the F-8 Crusader was the most numerous fighter type in US Navy service at the outset of America’s involvement in the Vietnam War in 1964, with 17 frontline squadrons operating a total of 482 F-8C/D/E aircraft.

It proved highly effective against North Vietnamese MiG-17s and MiG-21s during the 1965–68 Rolling Thunder campaign, being officially credited with shooting down 18 enemy aircraft. These victories accounted for 53 percent of all MiG kills claimed by Navy squadrons in that period.

The Crusader also took on a “bomb truck” role during the war, with carrier-based US Navy squadrons and land-based USMC units pounding communist forces in both North and South Vietnam, and it went on to train frustrated US Air Force (USAF) F-4 crews in air-combat maneuvering (ACM).

As Peter Mersky recounts in his book F-8 Crusader Units of the Vietnam War, in February 1972, VF-24 commanding officer Lt. Cdr. John Nichols—who had downed a MiG-17 in 1968—visited the USAF base at Udorn, Thailand. At that time, Air Force fighter units were only breaking even against North Vietnamese MiGs and sought outside expertise. In response, Nichols brought along another VF-24 pilot and two aviators from VF-211, together with their F-8s from the carrier USS Hancock.

The idea was to fly strike missions to the north alongside Air Force Phantom IIs, refuel, and then fit in some ACM training before returning to Udorn. This pace continued for several days, and on each occasion the Navy pilots outperformed their USAF counterparts, much to the satisfaction of the F-8 “drivers” and the ongoing frustration of the Air Force.

Nichols didn’t enjoy consistently defeating the Air Force—instead, he was irritated by what he saw as their poor ACM training and lack of skill. He bluntly criticized them for failing to fight in the vertical—an area where the F-8 excelled—during their engagements. To him, it appeared the Air Force had completely lost sight of the hard-won lessons from earlier wars.

Even Robin Olds—the Air Force’s leading MiG ace in Vietnam at the time, with four kills—was upset. After hearing about the Navy detachment’s visit, he arranged to fly a few sorties with the Udorn-based F-4 units. Nichols recalls that following one mission and the ensuing ACM practice, the Phantom II carrying Olds in the back seat taxied in. The canopy had barely cracked open when Olds’ helmet came flying out, quickly followed by the furious colonel himself. He was livid over how poorly his pilots had performed.

As a final move, the Air Force tried to stop Nichols from flying additional missions. The reason given was that the grey F-8s looked too similar to MiGs and were confusing USAF pilots, so he would have to allow his four Crusaders to be painted in camouflage. Nichols initially agreed, but when he asked how much weight the new paint would add—about 1,200 lbs.—he reconsidered. Absolutely not. The F-8 normally recovered with about 2000 lbs of fuel, and the new paint job would cut the allowable fuel to just 800 lbs, which was completely unacceptable. Nichols and his detachment, therefore, returned to the Hancock.

F-8 Crusader Units of the Vietnam War is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.

Photo by U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force