Delta-winged fighter bomber
The Mirage III was a fighter bomber aircraft with a delta wing and a fuselage built according to the area rule, which gave it a unique waisted profile. It was conceived and built within the framework of the light interceptor program outlined by the French Air Force following the Korean War (1950–1953).
The Mirage III E was built for low-altitude air strikes and was ordered on April 6, 1960. To provide room for the relevant electronic systems (navigation center, Doppler radar), the fuselage was extended by 30 cm. Additionally, a more powerful jet engine, the Atar 9C, was installed. On April 5, 1961, Jean Coureau flew the aircraft on its first flight at Istres. Later, an AN 52 tactical nuclear warhead was added to the French version. The Mirage III D was the Mirage III E’s export version.
With a list of subvariant designations, with minor variations in equipment fit, a good number of Mirage IIIEs were also built for export; these were acquired in small quantities by Argentina as the Mirage IIIEA, Brazil as the Mirage IIIEBR and Mirage IIIEBR-2, Lebanon as the Mirage IIIEL, Pakistan as the Mirage IIIEP, South Africa as the Mirage IIIEZ, Spain as the Mirage IIIEE, and Venezuela as the Mirage IIIEV.
KGB trying to steal a Lebanese Mirage
As told by Tom Cooper & Sergio Santana in their book Lebanese Civil War Volume 1: Palestinian Diaspora, Syrian and Israeli Interventions, 1970-1978, only months after the delivery of Mirage IIIELs to Lebanon, an unusual diplomatic incident occurred. Representatives of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut approached Hassan Badaoui, a former Force Aérienne Libanaise (FAL, Lebanese Air Force) officer discharged for misconduct, requesting him to establish contact with one of the Lebanese Mirage pilots and obtain information about its radar and avionics system.
Indeed, Badaoui then contacted Lieutenant Mahmoud Matar, promising him ‘lots of money’ if he cooperated. However, Matar played a double game: he promptly informed his superiors, who advised him to maintain contact with Badaoui and the Soviets and obtain evidence to charge them with espionage. Thus, during one of their subsequent meetings, the Soviets seemingly suggested Matar should, while on a long-range navigation training flight, defect via Turkey to Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan. In return, Matar was promised $3 million and that his family would be kept safe in Switzerland. As a guarantee of the seriousness of Soviet intentions, Matar received $200,000. His flight was scheduled for Oct. 3, 1969.
Vehement protests from Moscow
However, during the final meeting, when the Soviets met Matar to set up his flight plan, the Lebanese police broke into the apartment. An exchange of fire erupted, in which a Lebanese officer and a private, as well as Vladimir Vassileev (officially an engineer at the commercial mission of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut), and Aleksander Komiakov — a colonel of the Soviet Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, KGB) in charge of the entire operation—were wounded. Nevertheless, other Lebanese police officers managed to arrest both the Soviets and Hassan Badoui.
Only a few hours later, Beirut found itself on the receiving end of vehement protests from Moscow. These reached such proportions that the Lebanese found no other solution: still on their stretchers, Vassileev and Komiakov were brought to an Aeroflot airliner waiting for them at Beirut IAP, on Oct. 4, 1969, and flown back to Moscow.
Lebanese Civil War Volume 1: Palestinian Diaspora, Syrian and Israeli Interventions, 1970-1978 is published by Helion & Company and can be ordered here.

Photo by U.S. Air Force and French Air Force Via FAST Museum Twitter Account