On Jun. 2, 1972, a remarkable duel between a MiG-19 and a 58th TFS F-4E flown by Maj. Phil Handley and 1Lt Jack Smallwood took place
The intense aerial combat that defined the Linebacker offensive of 1972–73 over North Vietnam resulted in USAF F-4 Phantom II crews destroying 48 MiG-19s and MiG-21s.
Despite limited investment in missile upgrades or tactical reform since the end of Rolling Thunder four years prior, the USAF did field the gun-equipped F-4E, whose 20mm cannon accounted for seven aerial kills. Electronic improvements — particularly the APX-80 Combat Tree IFF interrogator — also enhanced the effectiveness of the AIM-7 Sparrow missile in combat.
Even so, unreliable missiles and rigid tactics kept the kill rate against Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) MiGs disappointingly low when air combat over the North resumed in early 1972.
As recounted by Peter E. Davies in USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1972–73, June 1972 saw a marked uptick in MiG activity, costing the USAF seven aircraft—all F-4s. Only two MiGs were downed by USAF fighters in return, with the US Navy claiming three additional kills. On June 13, a 432nd TRW MiGCAP flight chased a decoy formation of MiG-19s only to be ambushed from behind by two MiG-21s. F-4E 67-0365 of the 308th TFS was struck, sending its two crew members into captivity and raising further doubts about the “fluid four” formation—a concept that routinely left the fourth aircraft dangerously exposed.
The MiGs’ high-speed diving attacks from altitude placed the slower F-4s at a consistent disadvantage. On one occasion involving another 308th TFS loss, the flight leader noted that a MiG-21 had passed through so rapidly that any pursuit was essentially futile.
The Udorn Wing answered on June 21 in a remarkable engagement between a MiG-19 and an F-4E of the 58th TFS, flown by Maj. Phil Handley and 1Lt Jack Smallwood. More than 250 US aircraft were operating against North Vietnam’s supply and transport network that day, with Handley’s F-4E leading the “Brenda” MiGCAP flight roughly 40 miles northeast of Hanoi. The 58th TFS CO, John Downey, was element leader, with Bob Ellis on his wing.
The two elements became separated — first by a violent SAM evasion maneuver, then by the second element hitting minimum fuel reserves and departing the area. Handley soon began withdrawing his own element from the CAP station. He had already jettisoned his 600-gallon centerline tank before entering the target area and shed his 370-gallon wing tanks once they were exhausted just before egress. His Homestead AFB Phantom II carried two AIM-7s in the rear missile bays, a pair of AIM-4s outboard, and an ALQ-87 jamming pod in the forward-left bay.
It was the M61 Vulcan cannon, however, that proved decisive. As Handley’s flight departed the CAP area, two MiG-19s climbed to intercept. Forewarned of the threat, Handley had already pushed his speed up, wanting to reach corner velocity before any engagement developed. By the time contact was made, he was at Mach 1.2, descending through 500 feet. One MiG crossed his flight path at 90 degrees, traveling at roughly 500 knots. From a slant range of just 200–300 feet, Handley opened fire. The MiG was hit, and as Handley pulled into a vertical climb, both he and his wingman’s crew—Capts. Stan Green and Douglas Eden watched the stricken aircraft trail fire, lose altitude, and roll uncontrollably before slamming into the ground in an explosion.
Back at Udorn, post-flight inspection revealed the full story of that brief burst of cannon fire. The gun had been fired on a previous sortie without being logged, leaving only 310 of the standard 640 rounds aboard. After Handley’s three-second engagement, just ten rounds remained — a testament to the extraordinary precision of the shot.
For the June 21 mission, Handley had devised a “fluid two” formation, sketched it on a napkin the evening before, and briefed it the following morning. The concept proved highly effective, addressing the core weakness of the “fluid four”—namely, that at lower altitudes in denser air, the higher g-forces in turning maneuvers left the fourth aircraft unable to maintain position and vulnerable to attack. The F-86 era, where altitude was paramount, had favored four-ship formations; at 15,000–20,000 feet, the calculus had fundamentally changed.
USAF F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1972–73 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
