The first US F-15 kill and the first kill of Operation Desert Storm
More than 15 years after the aircraft had first been used by the Air Force, “star-spangled” F-15s had to wait until Operation Desert Storm to win the type’s battle spurs, mostly due to the experiences of USAF fighter crews in the Vietnam War.
The F-15C was responsible for six of the USAF’s kills against the Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) during the events of the first night of Desert Storm.
In the early hours of Jan. 17, 1991, the 58th TFS launched two flights of four F-15Cs, operating with the call-signs ‘Citgo 61′ to ’64’ and ‘Pennzoil 61′ to ’64’. Capt. Jon ‘JB’ Kelk, flying F-15C 85-0125, call-sign ‘Pennzoil 63′, was one of the 58th TFS pilots sortied on the opening night of the war, as he recalls in Steve Davies’ book F-15C Eagle Units in Combat:
‘I was the number three guy in “Pennzoil” flight, with Rick Tollini as flight lead. We were paired four-ship, and the plan was that we would alternate the lead role the other night, so he would lead tonight and I would lead the next mission—both of us were FWS graduates, so it made sense to alternate the responsibility. Larry Pitts was in the number two jet and my number four was Mark Williams.’
The broad ATO plan lot the first night was to use F-117s and F-15E Strike Eagles to make a surprise attack at 0300 hrs local.
Horrendous weather
Kelk explained:
‘This was to take place over Baghdad and H2 and H3 airfields, where the Strike Eagles would engage in Scud missile hunting activities at a low level, undetected. As they egressed, we were to take our aircraft and shoot down all the bad guys — a wall of our eight F-15C Eagles to mow down whoever took off from Iraqi airfields in the area.’
Despite the plan’s simplicity, it quickly came apart. Notwithstanding horrendous weather that presented some of the toughest air-to-air refueling conditions the pilots had ever experienced—towering cumulonimbus up to 30,000 ft on a pitch-black, turbulent night and without any external lights—the IrAF learned of the F-15Es’ ‘surprise attack’ through rudimentary intelligence assets, as Capt. Kelk explained:
‘The problem Was that there were manned listening posts along the border where Iraqi soldiers listened for the sound of aircraft. A flight of 18 F-15Es makes a lot of noise!
‘Shooting down one of your friends is a mortifying thought, and even though we had our own means of identifying a contact and AWACS was there to help, it is a much better plan to keep “friendlies” and hostiles apart. The key component of the plan, therefore, was to let the F-117s and F-15Es clear out of the area. That way, when we went north into Iraq, we knew that anything in front of us was an enemy.
The call to push
‘However, at around 0305 hrs, AWACS called to tell us that it had detected Iraqis flying, which was a problem because we were still marshaling some 50 miles to the south of the Saudi-Iraq border, and “Citgo” flight, which was planned to marshal up with us before the push towards Iraq, was about 100 miles behind us. We should have had plenty more time, but as soon as AWACS called, “Pennzoil” flight pushed north regardless.’
When the call came to push, Kell was less than pleased at going into battle with ‘friendlies’ and enemies mixed together ahead of him.
The flight assumed a lateral separation of around five miles, with each wingman displaced from his lead by another two miles. This nine-mile ‘wall’ formation was about to initiate the first contact of the war with the IrAF. Manning the F-15Cs from left to right were Pitts, Tollini, Kelk, and Williams.
‘Pennzoil’ was directed by AWACS to engage two groups of bandits located northeast of Radif al Khali Highway Strip and southeast of Mudaysis AB. Tollini and Pitts broke off to engage the western group, whilst Kelk and Williams ‘were snapped’—given’ radar vectors by AWACS—to the eastern group.
Enemy contacts
Fifty miles into Iraq, Kelk picked up enemy contacts on his radar:
‘I got a spike (radar warning indication) that someone had locked onto me at about the same time as I locked onto him. Our formation was now “Pennzoil 1” and “2” in the west and “Pennzoil 3” and “4” in the east. My contact range was about 35 miles, and, to my knowledge, there was just the one guy out in front. As I pressed the attack, Williams stayed in radar sweep to check for other contacts.
‘We had a thing called Mode 4 rollover, where all the (encrypted) Mode 4 IFF codes changed at 0300 hrs. But what if a guy was doing other things then? What if he was trying to evade, drop bombs, forget to change the code, or move the switch? I didn’t want to shoot down a guy just because he had forgotten to flick a switch, so I wanted to get additional confirmation from AWACS.
‘There was so much going on that the call was never completed, so had to use my own on-board systems to determine that my target was not friendly. The bandit climbed from about 7000 ft to 17,000 ft, and was clearly maneuvering in relation to me when I eventually took the shot. I was in an advantageous position at 30,000 ft because I could increase the range of my weapons against the lower-flying MiG.’
As Kelk closed on his target, Tollini and Pitts saw their group turn away and depart the area, allowing them to head back east to support their formation.
The first US F-15 kill
Turning right towards Kelk and Williams, Tollini was also spiked momentarily by the Ione target—an IrAF MiG-29.
As Kelk and the enemy jet hurtled towards each other at a combined speed of more than 1400 mph, the American pilot closed his eyes to protect his night vision and pressed the pickle button on his control stick, unleashing one of his four AIM-7M Sparrow air-to-air missiles. Simultaneously, he wrenched his F-15C into a high-G turn and enthusiastically mashed a button on his throttle to release chaff.
‘I fired the missile from high altitude and at above the Mach, whit gave me a decided advantage; I distinctly remember feeling the missile coming off—a 500-lb missile leaving the aeroplane is somewhat hard to miss—yet inside the cockpit on the armament status panel, I had an indication telling me that all four missiles were still remaining. I knew what I’d felt, even though there were now conflicting cockpit cues, so I knew that it had come off.
`After I had shot my missile, I started dropping chaff and flying defensive maneuvers in case he had shot at me. I also wanted to get down low to cause him some look-down/shoot-down problems—it was time to get lower and maneuver away. In this case, the chaff and maneuvering broke his lock, and with the spike gone, I turned in and pointed at the contact once again. I then saw him blow up at co-altitude (and approximately ten miles away). It was nothing like the red glowing fireballs that you hear about—it was a bright, purplish-white color that lasted three to five seconds. Then it was dark again.’
Capt Omar Goben
The MiG-29 pilot went down with his jet and was killed. He is believed to have been Capt. Omar Goben, who had previously flown MiG-21s and MiG-23s and who had two Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) F-5 kills to his name.
Kelk’s kill was verified the next morning by Intelligence as a MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum.’ He was the first American to score a kill in the F-15.
F-15C Eagle Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by Master Sgt. Mary-Dale Amison / U.S. Air Force
