Although MiG-25 Foxbats are not particularly manoeuvrable aircraft, their aggressive manoeuvring during approach, ‘painting’ of US Navy aircraft with their radars, and facing F-14s head-on was a clear show of hostile intention
During the Cold War, improvements in Soviet long-range patrol and bomber aircraft created the need for a naval fleet defense fighter capable of intercepting high-altitude bombers far beyond visual range. Grumman responded with the legendary F-14 Tomcat. Armed with the long-range AIM-54 Phoenix missile, the F-14 could target multiple enemy aircraft at distances greater than 90 miles. To combine interceptor-level speed with the ability to carry such heavy weapons, Grumman designed the aircraft with variable-sweep wings, allowing it to perform effectively across a broad range of speeds.
The F-14 entered combat for the first time in August 1981, when it shot down two Libyan Su-22s over the Gulf of Sidra. In the years that followed, the Tomcat continued to see significant action in that region.
Relations between the United States and Libya worsened after the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 on June 14, 1985, and the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27 of the same year. The U.S. accused Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi of being connected to these incidents through his backing of the suspected organizer, Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal.
In response to the Rome and Vienna attacks, the U.S. Navy launched a series of Freedom of Navigation missions near Libya under the codename Attain Document. The first phase took place from January 26 to 30, 1986, and the second from February 12 to 15, both without conflict. The third phase began on March 23, 1986, involving a surface action group from the United States Sixth Fleet. This force included the aircraft carriers USS America, USS Coral Sea, and USS Saratoga, along with five cruisers, six frigates, twelve destroyers, 250 aircraft, and 27,000 personnel carrying out three carrier operations near the Gulf. Support ships USS Detroit, USS Savannah, and USS Mount Baker provided fuel, ammunition, food, and other supplies to sustain the entire battle group.
Following the earlier period of rising tension—particularly the encounters between U.S. Navy pilots and Libyan Arab Air Force interceptors during Operation Attain Document II—there was a strong sense of anticipation in the ready rooms aboard all three aircraft carriers, as David “Hey Joe” Parsons recounts in Libyan Air Wars Part 2: 1985–1986 by Tom Cooper, Albert Grandolini, and Arnaud Delalande.
“The MiGs and other Libyan fighters had been very active against Saratoga’s F-14s (VF-74 and VF-103), so we were certain that we’d see more of [the] same when we arrived in America in March. We were so sure that I designed a kill marking scheme (green circle and black plan view of respective aircraft) and fashioned cardboard silhouettes of all the type fighters in service with [the] Libyans.”
Operation Attain Document III began at 1:00 a.m. local time on March 23, 1986. Throughout the day, all U.S. Navy aircraft stayed north of 32°30′. To the surprise of nearly everyone aboard the American warships, Libya did not respond, as Parsons explains:
“The Libyans got quite shy after we got three carriers on line in the Gulf of Sidra. But our CO was VERY aggressive, and we pressed the ROE to the limit. He even had the Libyan control tower frequency in one of his radios and taunted the Libyans at Benghazi to come out and play.”
Once the Pentagon announced Operation Attain Document III, the Libyan Arab Air Force quickly scattered many of its Mirage, MiG-21, and MiG-23 aircraft to bases farther inland. At Benina Air Base near Benghazi, for instance, only one of the three MiG-23 squadrons normally stationed there remained, while the other two were moved to southern Libya. The exact motive behind this redeployment is still unclear, but it appears that Gaddafi and his commanders were preparing for possible U.S. strikes on Libyan airfields. This choice was somewhat ironic, since the Libyan Air Force already operated eleven well-established air bases along the Mediterranean coast, meaning its forces were already fairly spread out even in peacetime.
When no Libyan interceptors were launched, Tomcats from the USS Saratoga and USS America crossed the so-called “Line of Death” multiple times at about 8:15 p.m., holding two combat air patrol stations over the Gulf of Sidra, one located roughly 60 miles (96.5 km) from the Libyan coast. Yet again, Libya made no response. Only later did the Libyan SA-5 missile site near Sidra activate its Square Pair early warning radar and lock onto U.S. Navy aircraft. Radar and electronic warfare personnel in Task Force Zulu closely monitored their screens, expecting the Libyans to fire, but contrary to those expectations, no action followed.
As the situation remained quiet, Vice Admiral Frank B. Kelso, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, directed the surface action group to proceed. At noon on March 24, the USS Ticonderoga, USS Scott, and USS Caron crossed the “Line of Death” under the protection of Tomcats flying combat air patrols, along with Corsairs and Intruders conducting strike combat air patrols. One of the F-14s supporting the surface group was flown by VF-33’s deputy commander, Lieutenant Commander Michael “Smiles” Bucchi, with Radar Intercept Officer Lieutenant Commander Ken “Heimy” Heimgartner. Another pilot from their squadron later described the mission this way:
“Smiles and Heimy were already legends between Tomcat crews. During that sortie, they flew an aircraft equipped with the TCS. That is a stabilized video camera with telescopic lens installed under the nose of the Tomcat, which enabled them to visually identify such aircraft as MiG-25 in clear weather from several dozen kilometers away. The TCS was brand new and very expensive, and our squadron had only three aircraft equipped with one (we got many more of these sets when Saratoga out-chopped [left the Mediterranean]). That was the way it was even back then: not enough gear to go around—and this was during the `go-go- buildup’ of the Reagan years.”
“Smiles and Heimy flew the F-14A serial number 161142, modex AB200, which was the best aircraft in [the] squadron and equipped with TCS. Their wingman flew the Tomcat serial number 159021 modex AB206: that was an elderly jet that spent much of that cruise in the hangar together with another ‘senior, 159010/AB207. It had no TCS.”
Unlike the usual practice in the U.S. Air Force, where the weapons load for participating aircraft is typically determined by higher command, senior U.S. Navy leaders allowed individual squadrons to choose their own armament, as Parsons explained:
“Among the F-14 crews aboard the America, there were some differences in terms of the weapons load. In VF-102, we preferred to arm our Tomcats with Sparrows and Sidewinders only. We were expecting to fly escorts and engage in dogfights, and wanted to have our machines as light as possible. The VF-33 preferred the 2/2/2 configuration instead: two Sidewinders, two Sparrows, and two long-range Phoenix missiles. They wanted to be ready to use [the] much-vaunted Phoenix if there was a chance, even if this increase the weight of their aircraft.”
The two Tomcats under Bucchi’s lead had only just arrived near their assigned CAP station when their crews almost had the chance to use their Phoenix missiles in combat. After the U.S. Navy’s surface action group entered waters that Libya regarded as its own, two MiG-25PDS fighters stationed forward at Benina Air Base were launched with orders to bring down any aircraft in the area, according to former Libyan Arab Air Force MiG-25 pilot Ali Thani:
“I did not expect us to be successful but was determined to carry out my orders. We climbed to 6,000m (19,685ft). The GCI vectored us to about 30 km from the nearest target and then ordered me to activate my radar, acquire a target, and open fire. This was my final encounter with Tomcats, and I was expecting them to be armed with Phoenix missiles. For this reason, I decided not to lock-on to them and fire one of my R-40RDs, but instead wanted to get close and wait for an opportunity to deploy my short-range R-60MKs… While approaching, we maneuvered as so often before: whenever they turned to one side, the GCI redirected us. This was repeated several times until we got closer, and I turned directly towards one of [the] Tomcats, trying to lock-on with a missile. It did not work because the Tomcat disappeared from my view too soon.”
Even though the MiG-25 Foxbat was not known for exceptional maneuverability, its forceful movements during the approach, its radar targeting of U.S. Navy aircraft, and its direct head-on posture toward the F-14s clearly signaled hostile intent. However, Admiral Kelso had not yet issued the required code word, so the new rules of engagement were still not active. As a result, the MiGs had to fire first before the Tomcats could respond. Bucchi and his wingman, therefore, had no choice but to outmaneuver them.
The two F-14s turned away and pulled the MiGs down to roughly 5,000 feet (1,524 meters), where the Tomcats held a major advantage in maneuverability. They then moved into the Libyan aircraft’s six o’clock position, directly behind them. As Bucchi worked to keep the lead MiG in view and switched his weapons selector to guns, Heimgartner reported the MiGs’ “excessive actions and intent” to the E-2C and asked for authorization to fire. That request was relayed to the USS America.
At the same time, the lead MiG-25, flown by Thani, began a slow right turn, with the second MiG following, before both reversed to the left. Bucchi stayed on them, and Heimgartner again requested permission to engage. Several minutes passed with no response while the lead Tomcat remained in pursuit behind the lead MiG-25. Then both Libyan fighters lit their afterburners, broke sharply to the left, and fled south. By the time the air warfare commander aboard the USS America finally authorized the Tomcats to fire, adding, “take the bastards on,” the two F-14As were already heading back to refueling aircraft.
The TCS footage that follows shows U.S. Navy F-14s intercepting and tracking a Libyan MiG-25, Su-22, and MiG-23 over the Gulf of Sidra.
Libyan Air Wars Part 2: 1985-1986 is published by Helion & Company and is available to order here.
Photo by PHAN David Casper / U.S. Navy
