Unsurprisingly, at least one US U-2 pilot underway over Cuba in the late 1960s experienced a rude shock when a MiG-21 actually shot over the top of his aircraft before tumbling out of control into the thicker air down below
The Lockheed U-2 is arguably the most famous spy plane ever built, renowned for the daring missions flown by its pilots over, or close to, hostile territory. In particular, the bold and provocative sorties conducted by CIA-operated U-2s over the Soviet Union came to symbolize the intense rivalry between the United States and the USSR during the early to mid–Cold War era.
Much has been written about some of these overflights. Yet the details of how the Soviets—and later the Chinese armed forces—responded to such missions, and what they experienced while attempting not only to detect and track but also to intercept and shoot down the high‑flying spy planes, remain a largely untold part of the story.
As Krzysztof Dabrowski notes in his book Hunt for the U-2, any account of the campaign against the U-2 would be incomplete without at least briefly examining the efforts by manned Chinese interceptors to bring down these high‑flying intruders. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had effectively closed the skies to low‑altitude Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) incursions over mainland China, relying on their first‑generation jets such as the MiG‑15 and MiG‑17.
Even so, high‑altitude reconnaissance aircraft remained beyond their capabilities. The situation did not improve after Moscow—responding to a request from Beijing—approved a license in October 1957 for domestic production of the MiG‑19P and supplied the necessary technical documentation. Although the PRC subsequently began series production of three variants and significantly enhanced the overall reliability of the original design, the split with the USSR and the ensuing Cultural Revolution created numerous difficulties that severely delayed their entry into operational service. As a result, the PLAAF and PLANAF still had almost no MiG‑19s in frontline use during the early 1960s. A similar pattern applied to China’s attempts to acquire the next—and particularly important—Soviet interceptor, one that was at least theoretically capable of reaching the U‑2’s operating altitude: the MiG‑21F‑13 (NATO reporting name: Fishbed).
The contract covering the transfer of MiG‑21F‑13 technology, along with its Tumansky R-11F-300 engine, to China was concluded on March 30, 1962, during a brief improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Under this deal, roughly two dozen aircraft were supplied as knockdown kits for local assembly. However, before the Soviets could provide the full set of technical documents required for full‑scale production, ties between Beijing and Moscow deteriorated once again. The Cultural Revolution that followed nearly destroyed the entire program; the few engineers who remained on the job had to rely heavily on reverse engineering many critical components. The MiG‑21F‑13s that were available were assembled and put into frontline service with the PLAAF, while a small number were retained as reference airframes to support research and development of China’s indigenous version, the J‑7.
Bringing down a U-2 with a MiG-21F-13 demanded exceptional flying skills—plus a great deal of luck. In the final phase of such an intercept, the MiG-21F-13 was essentially out of control, following a ballistic arc with little to no chance for the pilot to properly acquire the target and fire. It is therefore no surprise that at least one US U-2 pilot over Cuba in the late 1960s was startled when a MiG-21 suddenly shot past above his aircraft before plunging helplessly into denser air below. Even so, the new danger was taken seriously enough that the Taiwanese fitted their U-2s with the same ‘Sugar Scoop’ exhaust shroud already in use on USAF U-2s. This was an 18-inch extension on the lower part of the engine exhaust designed to mask the hottest section of the aircraft from infrared-guided air-to-air missiles—such as the R-3S, the MiG-21F-13’s primary weapon.
Based on available information, the first apparently successful interception attempt by PLAAF MiG-21F-13s seems to have taken place only on March 14, 1965. On that date, Lieutenant Wu Zaixi (Wu Tsai-hsi) of the 35th Black Cat Squadron reported seeing smoke trails resembling those from air-to-air missiles passing near his aircraft. Whether this is what actually occurred remains uncertain, but Wu’s U-2 was not hit, and he returned without incident. A comparable episode occurred on May 27, 1965, when the cameras of the U-2 flown by Wang Sijue (Wang His-chueh) captured images of a Chinese MiG-21F-13 flying beneath his aircraft—close enough to seem almost within reach, yet still too distant to effectively attack.
Further interception attempts clearly took place, and Beijing appears to have claimed several Taiwanese U-2 shootdowns in April 1968, January 1969, on May 16, 1969, and again in 1970, even though no aircraft were actually lost on those dates. What is firmly established is that on Apr. 29, 1971, a U-2R flown by Lieutenant-Colonel Shen Zongli (Shen Thung-li) was cruising at 22,265 m (73,047 ft) on a reconnaissance mission over Dalian Lushun on the Liaoning Peninsula when his RWR and the System 20—an infrared warning device covering the rear hemisphere—indicated a threat from the left rear. Shen initiated a gentle turn to the left, and the alert disappeared. Only a few seconds later, however, a new warning signaled a threat from the right rear. At that moment, the Taiwanese pilot finally spotted a MiG-21F-13 flying alongside his wing—visible for just about two seconds before the interceptor dropped away and vanished from sight.
In the end, neither the PLAAF nor the PLANAF succeeded in shooting down any ROCAF U-2s using their manned interceptors. Although they could sometimes climb to the U-2’s operating altitude and even get fairly close, not even the MiG-21 could stay in a firing position long enough to make a successful attack. Consequently, Chinese pilots’ efforts never resulted in a confirmed kill.
Hunt for the U-2 is published by Helion & Company and is available to order here.
Photo by: U.S. Air Force and Max Smith via Wikipedia
