‘Some sorties included highly dynamic dissimilar air combat exercises against the US Marine Corps F/A 18, as it had a similar performance to the Iraqi MiG 29. The Marines were excellent, flying Iraqi tactics so that we could hone our skills,’ Wg Cdr D R Hamilton, commanding No. 11 Sqn
When the 1990 Gulf Crisis began after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Royal Air Force (RAF) reacted by deploying Tornado F3 fighters to Saudi Arabia to help protect the kingdom from any further attacks. These were soon supplemented by Tornado GR1 strike aircraft sent to Bahrain. Over time, three Tornado GR1 wings were set up in Bahrain, Tabuk, and Dhahran, along with a dedicated Tornado GR1A reconnaissance detachment.
According to Michael Napier in his book RAF Tornado Units of Gulf War I, by August 16—just five days after the RAF Tornado F3s arrived in the region—there had already been three instances of Iraqi Air Force (IrAF) aircraft crossing the border. In the first case, an aircraft believed to be a MiG-25 ‘Foxbat’ flew five nautical miles into Saudi territory at 35,000 feet and 650 knots. In the second, a jet thought to be a Mirage F1EQ also entered Saudi airspace by five nautical miles. Both of these aircraft immediately turned back once they were locked onto by US Air Force (USAF) F-15 radars. The third incident took place at night, when an unidentified contact was designated hostile by AWACS and targeted by a Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-15, prompting it to turn away in time.
Additional air activity involved AWACS reports of Iraqi Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) operating north of the border. Coalition CAP areas were laid out as 30‑nautical‑mile squares, running from over the mid‑Gulf sea area in the east to roughly 300 nautical miles inland along the Iraqi border in the west. It took about 30 minutes to fly from Dhahran to these CAP zones. A 60‑nautical‑mile buffer zone separated the Iraqi border from the CAPs, while only 30 nautical miles separated the CAPs from the Kuwaiti border. USAF and RSAF aircraft were permitted to enter the buffer zone right up to the border, but RAF aircraft operating in the buffer zone had to stay at least ten nautical miles away from it. CAPs were directed by USAF Boeing E‑3 Sentry or US Navy Grumman E‑2 Hawkeye aircraft. On operational missions, Tornado F3s were armed with four AIM‑9L and four Skyflash TEMP air‑to‑air missiles and equipped with 2,250‑liter underwing fuel tanks.
Training missions were also flown with live weapons. Using fully armed aircraft for training meant aircrews did not need to alternate between live and practice configurations, and groundcrews avoided the extra effort of repeatedly loading and unloading missiles. The opposing forces on these sorties could consist of up to ten RAF Tornado GR1s, Jaguars, or USAF F-4Gs, and there were also mutual intercept exercises involving Tornado F3s.
Furthermore, Wing Commander D. R. Hamilton, commander of No. 11 Squadron, who was tasked with creating a new unit—No. 11 (Composite) Squadron, later nicknamed the ‘Desert Eagles’—to take over the Tornado F3 detachment at Dhahran permanently, recalled that some missions ‘included highly dynamic dissimilar air combat exercises against the US Marine Corps F/A-18, as it had similar performance to the Iraqi MiG-29. The Marines were excellent, flying Iraqi tactics so that we could hone our skills.’ On another training mission on November 8, the Tornados trained against a large opposing force of 26 USAF F-16s and four F-4Gs.
Because of the combination of operational missions and training sorties, the ‘Desert Eagles’ were flying over 1,000 hours per month, compared with the usual squadron flying commitment of 280 hours. Above all, this represented a remarkable accomplishment by the engineering ground crew, led by Sqn Ldr G. Morgan.
The seriousness of the operational situation became clear on October 16, when a Tornado F3 flying a combat air patrol detected a high‑speed contact in Iraqi airspace heading toward the border. The aircraft turned out to be an IrAF ‘Foxbat’. Acting on instructions from the AWACS controller, the Tornado crew armed their missiles and moved north to intercept. However, as they did so, the MiG‑25 turned away, removing the immediate threat.
Subsequent analysis showed that, given the high closing speeds and the aircraft’s position so close to the border, any successful engagement would likely have brought the ‘Foxbat’ down on Iraqi rather than Saudi territory. Such an outcome could easily have triggered a serious political crisis at a time when diplomatic efforts were still underway to ease regional tensions. Consequently, the CAP stations were repositioned a further 50 miles back from the border.
One month later, Squadron Leader Paxton, with Flight Lieutenant M. Tetlow as his crew member, was in charge of a night-time combat air patrol (CAP).
“My nav said that he had two contacts approaching the border from the north. He called the AWACS and reported that we had contact with two slow movers heading south. He gave their position, and an American voice responded, ‘No, you haven’t.’ The nav repeated the details, and the American replied, much more insistent now, ‘NO YOU HAVEN’T!’ That’s when the penny dropped. We subsequently found out that they were our own special forces helicopters returning from a drop behind enemy lines.”
RAF Tornado Units of Gulf War I is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by SAC Sarah Burrows, Sgt Rick Brewell / Crown Copyright and Alex Beltyukov via Wikipedia
