On the night of Mar. 13, 1958, one Mig-17PF flown by Wang Guo Shan of the 18th Division was the PLAAF’s last chance against a 34th Squadron (Black Bat) B-17 that had flown for six hours over the southern provinces
After Mao’s communist forces took control of mainland China in 1949, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) formed a tense and uneasy alliance with the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan to conduct covert aerial operations over the mainland. These missions involved inserting agents, dropping propaganda leaflets, and gathering signals, photographic, and nuclear-related intelligence. In response, Communist China’s air defense network reacted with determination and resourcefulness to counter these unwelcome incursions.
As detailed by Chris Pocock and Clarence Fu in The Black Bats: CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan 1951-1969, Chinese military specialists modified both Soviet equipment and tactics. In 1957, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 11th Aviation School, along with the 14th and 18th Air Divisions, focused on enhancing the performance of the newly introduced MiG-17PF fighters. The limitations of the fighter’s RP-5 intercept radar were already well known to both Western intelligence and the Chinese. Its effective range was only about 2.5 miles, and when operating below roughly 3,000 feet, it was unable to distinguish aircraft targets from ground clutter.
One Chinese approach to solving the second issue was to block the radar’s 14-degree downward elevation scan. The upward scan began at two degrees below the horizon and could still be adequate for interception, as long as Ground-Controlled Interception (GCI) directed the MiG pilot accurately so that he flew toward the target at the same altitude. However, the PLAAF soon recognized that, to engage a relatively slow aircraft like the B-17, the MiG-17 had to be flown at a 4–5 degree Angle of Attack (AoA) to avoid stalling. At this nose-up attitude, the radar’s 2-degree scan became ineffective unless the target was above the interceptor. Since the intruding aircraft from Taiwan typically flew at about 1,000 feet, they were usually lower than the intercepting MiGs. And attempting to descend below them at night would have been suicidal for the MiG pilots.
The Chinese pilots and technicians reconsidered the problem. The radar’s downward scan had only been restricted by seven degrees. With the MiG flying at a 4–5 degree angle of attack, the radar beam could effectively point 2–3 degrees below the horizon. This allowed them to search for the target while minimizing interference from ground clutter.
The radar-equipped MiG-17PFs were deployed to try to bring down the intruding aircraft. On the night of Mar. 13, 1958, a MiG-17PF flown by Wang Guo Shan of the 18th Division represented the PLAAF’s final opportunity to stop a 34th Squadron (Black Bat) B-17 that had been flying over China’s southern provinces for six hours. Before Wang took off from Shati airfield in Guangdong, no fewer than eleven MiG-15s had already been scrambled farther north. As the B-17 exited the mainland and continued flying low over the sea, Wang followed it for about 50 miles. With his fuel nearly exhausted, GCI instructed him to divert to Shuixi airfield on the Leizhou Peninsula, north of Hainan Island. However, fog moved in over the field, and Wang crashed and was killed while attempting to land.
This was the PLAAF’s second fatal loss that night. Earlier, a MiG-15bis flown by Yang Yu Jiang had taken off from Changsha to serve as a radio relay aircraft in the search for the B-17. Shortly after departure, radio contact with Yang was lost, and at 2300, the MiG crashed near Datuopu airfield.
The Black Bats CIA Spy Flights Over China from Taiwan 1951-1969 is published by Schiffer Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
