The VPAF’s determination to eliminate the highly disruptive effects of EB-66 jamming increased their efforts at interception. Air Defence Command gave the MiG-21 units a special ‘non-combat mission’, tasking them with developing tactics to attack EB-66s
According to Peter E. Davies in his book B/EB-66 Destroyer Units in Combat, the vulnerable EB-66 Destroyer electronic warfare aircraft flew along the edge of heavily defended airspace during the Vietnam War, detecting and jamming enemy radar frequencies with electronic signals and chaff to shield American bombers. These dangerous missions led to six combat losses—four caused by SA-2 missiles and one by a MiG-21—and once their significance became clear, they emerged as key targets for North Vietnamese air defenses.
Determined to counter the highly disruptive impact of EB-66 jamming, the Vietnamese People’s Air Force (VPAF) intensified its interception efforts. Air Defence Command assigned MiG-21 units a special ‘non-combat mission’, ordering them to develop tactics for attacking EB-66s. Before long, MiG controllers were directing MiG-21s toward EB-66 orbit areas, despite the Destroyers’ fighter escort.
On Nov. 19, 1967, MiG-21 pilots Vu Ngoc Dinh, who had been given special responsibility for intercepting EB-66s, and Nguyen Dang Kinh took off from Noi Bai Air Base to engage a Destroyer near Than Hoa. The two pilots separated, with one attacking from a high ‘perch’ and the other approaching from low altitude behind the EB-66. Kinh slipped past the F-4 escort and launched two R-3S missiles at the ECM aircraft, later claiming he had struck an engine and brought down the EB-66. Actually, the missiles detonated beneath the target, and the Takhli wing recorded no loss that day because the Destroyer’s crew had been warned about the MiGs by the F-4s in time to make an evasive dive. The Phantom IIs then pursued the retreating MiG-21s, but both managed to escape. A second attempt to attack an EB-66C the next day was also unsuccessful. Following these incidents, the ECM aircraft once again had to be withdrawn to positions south of the 21st parallel.
A less favorable MiG-21 encounter took place on Feb. 3, 1968, when two F-102A Delta Daggers from the 509th FIS were flying escort for an EB-66 at 36,000 ft near Sam Neua, close to the North Vietnam–Laotian border. Maj. A. L. Lomax led ‘Jersey White’ flight, with 1st Lt. Wallace Wiggins as his wingman in F-102A 56-1166. Meanwhile, at Noi Bai airfield in North Vietnam, 921st FR pilots Pham Thanh Ngan and Nguyen Van Coc—who would finish the war as the VPAF’s leading ace with nine kills—launched on their fourth interception mission of the day, heading toward two enemy aircraft detected by radar near Moc Chau.
Near the Laotian border, Ngan thought he saw a distant EB-66, but at closer range, he realized he was looking at the two F-102As. Lomax saw the MiGs, turned, and launched three AIM-4D Falcon missiles, all of which missed. Ngan maneuvered into Wiggins’ blind spot and triggered an R-3S (K-13A ‘Atoll’) missile which refused to leave its launch rail, but his second missile impacted the F-102A’s tail. Van Coc also fired an R-3S but it failed to guide. The MiG-21F-13s were then told to break off the engagement by their controller.
Near the Laotian border, Ngan initially believed he had spotted an EB-66 in the distance, but as he closed in, he realized the aircraft were actually two F-102As. After sighting the MiGs, Lomax turned and fired three AIM-4D Falcon missiles, but none found their mark. Ngan then moved into Wiggins’ blind spot and attempted to launch an R-3S (K-13A ‘Atoll’) missile, which failed to leave the rail, though his second missile struck the F-102A’s tail. Van Coc also launched an R-3S, but it did not track its target. The MiG-21F-13s were subsequently ordered by their controller to disengage.
Wiggins reported that his aircraft was experiencing control issues, and when Lomax inspected the Delta Dagger, he noticed an unexploded ‘Atoll’ missile lodged in the rear fuselage. Lomax then tried to reacquire the MiGs, but they had already withdrawn quickly, and moments later he watched Wiggins’ aircraft explode, with no indication that the pilot had ejected.
The effectiveness of USAF fighter cover was reflected in the fact that only one EB-66 was lost to MiGs during the entire war, despite sustained VPAF efforts. That loss took place over Laos, where EB-66Cs conducted as much as 12 hours of radar surveillance each day in 1970–71 before tanker shortages forced a reduction in operations. MiGs rarely posed a serious danger over Laos, and their only success there came on Jan. 14, 1968. On that date, 41st TEWS EB-66C 55-388, ‘Preview 01,’ was intercepted at 28,000 ft during an ELINT mission with five Destroyers, 65 miles southwest of Hanoi near Route 15 on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, while supporting a strike near Than Hoa.
Two MiG-21s from the 921st FR, piloted by Nguyen Dang Kinh—credited with downing an EB-66 on Nov. 19, 1967—and Dong Van Song, were scrambled from Noi Bai air base and directed toward the unescorted EB-66C. About 15 minutes into its orbit, they picked up the aircraft at a distance of eight miles. Nguyen Dang Kinh launched two R-3S infrared-guided missiles, but neither tracked properly. Dong Van Song, already credited with three F-105 kills, then fired an ‘Atoll,’ and his R-3S struck the EB-66C’s right engine and wing. Maj Hugh ‘Sonny’ Mercer Jr attempted to turn the aircraft toward safety, but the Destroyer went into a spin, prompting him to order his crew to bail out as they passed over the mountainous terrain of North Vietnam.
Three crewmen came down not far from one another. 1Lt Ron Lebert’s parachute became caught in a tree, leaving him hanging there for 17 hours until local troops cut him down and captured him. A search-and-rescue (SAR) mission was launched immediately from Nhakon Phanom RTAFB, and the aircraft made radio contact with four survivors through their emergency beacons. Darkness and poor weather postponed the rescue until the next morning, when a SAR team led by 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) HH-3E 64-14233 set out. Piloted by Capt Gregory Etzel, the helicopter entered the karst mountain region in visibility of only about 50 ft. While trying to clear a ridge, its rotor blades hit the mountainside and the helicopter crashed. Although the crew survived, several were seriously injured. They were left stranded on a steep slope 40 miles inside enemy territory. Two additional helicopters were dispatched, but both were hindered by the poor visibility, and one was hit and damaged by machine-gun fire.
On Jan. 17, an HH-3 rescued three members of the RB-66C crew. Lt Col James Thompson and instructor radar navigator Lt Col Attilio ‘Pete’ Pedroli—who had also come down in a tree on a mountainside but managed to lower himself safely to the ground—were recovered unharmed. Maj Mercer had suffered serious injuries during ejection from the spinning aircraft, including broken legs, and died in hospital three days later. The CIA tried to deploy a covert Bright Light rescue team to find the remaining four crewmen and coordinate a helicopter extraction, but they had apparently already been taken prisoner. Majs Thomas Sumpter and Irby Terrell, Capt Hubert Walker, and 1Lt Lebert—three of them EB-66C EWOs—remained in captivity until March 1973. Pedroli later returned to the 41st TEWS to finish his 100 missions.
At first, this incident did little to raise concern in Saigon about the MiG threat, and a mission flown along the same route on Jan. 18 encountered the same VPAF interception tactics. Fortunately, that crew managed to avoid the MiG-21 and its missiles. After this second encounter, Seventh Air Force ordered all EB-66s out of North Vietnamese airspace and assigned them additional MiGCAP protection against VPAF fighters crossing into Laos in an effort to intercept them. That policy remained in effect until Rolling Thunder ended on Nov. 2, 1968.
B/EB-66 Destroyer Units in Combat is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Air Force
