Despite flying the world’s most modern fighter interceptor armed with state-of-the-art AIM-7 and AIM-9 guided missiles, US Navy F-4 crews initially struggled to compete with their North Vietnamese counterparts
Even with the most advanced fighter-interceptor in the world, equipped with cutting-edge AIM-7 and AIM-9 guided missiles, US Navy F-4 crews faced challenges in matching their North Vietnamese opponents, who, despite having less experience and inferior aircraft like the MiG-17 and MiG-21, were still effective.
According to Brad Elward and Peter E. Davies in their book “US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965–70,” the Phantom II, despite its array of advanced and continually upgraded missiles, had a significant drawback—it did not have an internal gun. To address this major issue, crews attempted to install a centerline gun pod (the SUU-23, which housed the M61 Vulcan 20 mm six-barreled Gatling gun fitted in the self-powered GAU-4 unit), but this solution turned out to be ineffective and was ultimately discarded. When the gun pod was installed, the common centerline drop tank had to be removed, leading to the use of two smaller tanks that occupied critical space on the outer wing pylons. Furthermore, the overall unreliability of the gun pod was made worse by the impacts of deck launches and recoveries. Regardless of these challenges, a similar system achieved some success and gained broader usage within the USAF and Marines.
F-4 veteran and former Topgun instructor John Nash told Elward and Davies that the omission of an internal gun was ‘a tragic mistake.’
`The F-4 needed an internal gun. The USAF had the better F-4 in the E-model (which had an internal gun). The Navy bought the Mk 4 (GAU-4) gun pod, which was “worthless,” and that is an understatement. The NAVAIR civilians forbade us to go to Nellis and get 40 USAF SUU-16 gun pods for free when I was in VF-121/Topgun.
`Having an internal gun would have given the aircrews one more kill option. But as important as that, it would have changed the enemy’s tactics. A gun would have added a significant threat that would have had to have been defended against by the MiGs. As it was, in an air-to-air engagement, a US Navy F-4 at 500 ft behind a bogie was totally ineffective without a gun.’
While configurations were frequently based on specific missions, F-4Bs were capable of launching with as many as four AIM-7 missiles, four AIM-9 missiles, and a 600-US-gallon (2270 l) centerline tank. Unusual configurations, like carrying six Sparrows, occasionally occurred, as well as the use of 370-US-gallon (1400 l) tanks mounted on the wings. F-4s conducting Barrier Combat Air Patrols (BARCAP) were typically fitted with three AIM-9s, two AIM-7s, and a centerline tank, whereas Phantom IIs performing MiGCAP (pursuing MiGs) usually featured four AIM-9s and four AIM-7s, along with one to three external tanks.
The F-4B was powered by two General Electric J79-GE-8 turbojet engines, each capable of producing a maximum afterburner thrust of 17,000 pounds (75.65 kN), which helped propel it off the aircraft carrier deck with the aid of a catapult. While the J79 was generally a reliable engine, its main disadvantage was that it emitted a long, dark smoke trail when not in afterburner mode. This characteristic made Phantom IIs visible from several miles away, sometimes up to 25 miles. John Nash commented, “Smoking engines get you shot, or shot at.”
MiG pilots capitalized on this shortcoming during the Rolling Thunder campaign by executing surprise attacks on F-4 formations. The issue was ultimately resolved in later versions of the F-4J (starting from Block 37) and was also retrofitted into earlier Js and F-4Bs. Nevertheless, some squadrons continued to operate ‘smoking’ Phantom IIs until the end of the war, as noted by John Nash.
`We had an “additive rank” that could inject something into the engine that was supposed to stop the smoking. However, I never saw any of the “stuff”, and no one was concerned enough to get the program going! Min-burner stopped the smoke trails but burned gas faster – not the ideal remedy, but when no one cares enough to fix the problem, that’s the only solution.’
Crews were aware of this issue and came up with various clever ‘fix-alls,’ such as flying with minimum afterburner, swiftly altering altitude, and operating one engine at idle while the other at minimum burner. Capt. Jim Ruliffson, a previous F-4 pilot and the commanding officer of Topgun, also provided his thoughts on these strategies.
‘We trained in the States to go min-burner, which eliminated the smoke completely when setting up head-on engagements. Over North Vietnam, though, we rarely had the “luxury” of knowing there was a bogie nearby, let alone in a position for a classic head-on pass, so nobody went min-burner to eliminate smoke trails.’
Despite facing significant challenges and being constrained by stringent engagement policies that rendered any tactical benefits from having long-range weapons ineffective, Phantom II crews still succeeded. In the first five years of the conflict, fewer than ten naval aircraft were shot down by MiGs, demonstrating that the fighter crews had effectively fulfilled their responsibilities; during that same period, Navy F-4 crews eliminated at least 15 Vietnamese aircraft.
US Navy F-4 Phantom II MiG Killers 1965–70 is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by: U.S. Navy; Top image: unknown via F-16.net/forum
