Each A-7 pilot fired one preemptive Shrike, but someone in the group, who had probably forgotten the pre-briefed plan, called, ‘SAM!’ Someone else correctly answered, ‘No, that’s a Shrike!’
One of the best-known operations of the Vietnam Air War was Carrier Air Wing Nine’s (CVW-9) Alpha Strike against the Bai Duong rail yards on May 10, 1972. Due to earlier events that day, they anticipated a heavy North Vietnamese defense made up of SAMs, AAA, and MiGs. The combined Iron Hand/RESCAP mission supporting this strike was assigned to Lt. Cdr. Tom Gravley and Lt. Norm Birzer.
As described by Norman Birzer and Peter Mersky in their book US Navy A-7 Corsair II Units of the Vietnam War, the Iron Hand mission focused on suppressing enemy fire-control radiation, which was essential for accurately guiding surface-to-air missiles. For this mission, each A-7E Corsair II carried two AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles. Although this role mirrored that of the U.S. Air Force’s well-known ‘Wild Weasels,’ which used dedicated aircraft and specialized crews, all Navy attack squadrons and pilots were routinely equipped and trained to perform this task. The secondary role, RESCAP (Rescue Combat Air Patrol), involved directing and coordinating the recovery of downed aircrew.
Although Birzer had flown 170 combat missions over two tours—the previous one from the United States—most of his sorties had been over Laos and South Vietnam. He had only flown into North Vietnam about ten times. His mission on this occasion would be the middle launch in a sequence of three strikes.
“Going back into the North was scary and exciting at the same time,” he recalled. “A couple of pilots in our sister squadron had turned in their wings during this time. At least one was scared of getting hurt in North Vietnam, but most of us were eager. In fact, there was a fair amount of tactical maneuvering and complaining to get a fair share or more of the few A-7 sorties available.”
Flying A-7E BuNo 156818/NG 404, Birzer and his flight leader, Lt Cdr Tom Gravley, were armed with six cluster bomb units (CBUs) and two AGM-45 Shrike missiles. Serving as the ‘Argonauts’ weapons training officer, Birzer was regarded as the in-house authority on both the Iron Hand mission and the Shrike. “The Shrike was an extremely effective weapon against the SA-2’s guidance radar,” he recalled.
The typical SAM radar process began with an area-search radar acquiring potential targets, after which control shifted to a dedicated tracking radar. Once the missile was launched, it depended on guidance signals transmitted from the ground to reach its mark. While the SA-2 was in the air for this comparatively long flight time, the pilot of a Shrike-equipped aircraft would receive both audio and visual alerts through his cockpit warning systems. He would then maneuver and fire the high-speed Shrike based on the information provided by those receivers.
As it begins its flight, the missile widens its field of view until it detects radiation from the SAM site’s radar. Once it locks onto this radiation, the AGM-45 steers toward it, homing directly on the radar antenna at the launch complex. Thanks to the Shrike’s high reliability and precision, it typically struck the aim point, blasting some 40,000 superheated steel fragments into the antenna and control van, wrecking the equipment and killing the personnel inside.
It was inevitable that the enemy would devise methods to counter the Shrike. By using a separate search radar to determine the direction and altitude of approaching aircraft, SAM crews could roughly aim their SA-2s and launch them on a ballistic trajectory. Only after firing the missile would they switch on the guidance radar. This procedure concealed the exact location of the SAM launcher, but it also greatly diminished the crew’s ability to obtain a solid lock-on against a high-speed target.
Lt. Birzer devised a counter-tactic of his own. Because he knew the locations of the SAM sites most likely to engage his strike group, he worked out the exact point from which he needed to launch his Shrike. He then programmed this data into his A-7E’s computer so that the aircraft could indicate when he was in the correct position to fire.
After takeoff and rendezvous, he moved into position on the right flank of the strike group, with Lt. Cdr. Gravley flying on the left. Each A-7 was paired with an F-4 to shield the Iron Hand Corsairs from MiG threats. As they neared the marshalling yards, they encountered no active resistance—only a few intermittent tones on the RHAW (Radar Homing And Warning) system, indicating radar emissions. At a distance of 20 miles, the A-7s broke away from the main strike formation to line up more precisely on their assigned objectives. Birzer targeted a SAM site near Haiphong, while Gravley homed in on a similar installation near Hanoi.
Each A-7 pilot launched a preemptive Shrike, but someone in the formation—apparently forgetting the briefed plan—radioed, “SAM!” Another pilot quickly corrected him, replying, “No, that’s a Shrike!”
As the strike aircraft, led by Cdr. Eggert, began their attack runs, Birzer and Gravley descended and followed the formation in sequence. The airspace quickly became congested, as a second carrier strike group was slated to arrive over the same target area just ten minutes later.
“I strained to spot SAM launches,” Birzer recalled. “I saw no clouds of dust and no ‘telephone poles.’ I glanced above me and could see strange, large puffs of yellow-brown smoke. I was initially confused, but then I realized that they were 15 to 20 SAMs that had auto-detonated at the end of their terminal guidance time—about 60 seconds from launch.”
The SAMs must have all been launched ballistically to scare the strikers into diving toward the AAA zone, but the bombers did not even see them. The strategy seemed to work because 15-20 SAMs were launched and no guidance radiation signals were detected. Two strike aircraft were lost and a third badly damaged, but none due to guided SAMs.
The SAMs must have all been launched ballistically to scare the strikers into diving toward the AAA zone, but the bombers did not even see them. In that sense, the tactic appeared effective: some 15–20 SAMs were fired, yet no guidance radar emissions were picked up. Two strike aircraft were shot down, and a third was heavily damaged, but none of these losses were caused by radar-guided SAMs.
US Navy A-7 Corsair II Units of the Vietnam War is published by Osprey Publishing and is available to order here.
Photo by U.S. Navy
